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RECENT TRENDS
ENTRAPMENT

Ever since the Supreme Court's landmark
decision in United States v. Russell,' the various circuits have attempted to apply its holding regarding entrapment to numerous other
factual situations. The Court in Russell held
that the primary criterion for availability of
the entrapment defense was the absence of the
defendant's predisposition toward committing
the crime, in accord with the holdings of Sorrells v. United States2 and Sherman v. United
States.3 The defendant in Russell was con1411 U.S. 423 (1973). For an analysis of the
rationale of this case and those leading up to it
see Note, Criminal Lavw--Entrapment-Predisposition of Defendant Crucial Factor in Entrapment
Defense, 59 CORNE.L L. Rxv. 546 (1974); Note,
Criminal Law-Entrapment in the Federal Courts
-Subjective Test Reaffirmed Against Lower Court
Departures, 42 FORDHAm L. REv. 454 (1973);
Note, Entrapment, 64 J. CRim. L. & C. 407 (1973);
Note, Entrapment: Sorrells to Russell, 49 NoTRE
DAME LAW. 579 (1974); Note, Elevation of Entrapment to a ConstitutionalDefense, 7 U. Micr.
J.L. REFORm 361 (1974). For a recent short commentary on the state of the law on entrapment
see The Wall Street journal, Sept. 22, 1975, at 1,
col. 1.
2287 U.S. 435 (1932). The defendant was convicted of possessing and selling whiskey in violation of the National Prohibition Act. The defense
of entrapment was based on the government
agent's testimony of his solicitation of the defendant at his home three times on the same day. The
defendant finally left and returned with a half-galIon of liquor which he sold to the agent. In the
absence of any evidence that the defendant was
predisposed, i.e., the government's evidence did not
show, for instance, that he had ever possessed or
sold any intoxicating liquor prior to the transaction in question, the Supreme Court reversed his
conviction. The Court found that it was error to
hold that as a matter of law there was no entrapment. It held that where the defendant was not
predisposed, and the crime was induced by the
government agent's persuasion and creative activity, the defense of entrapment was appropriate. Id.
at 442.
3 356 U.S. 369 (1958). The conviction was reversed because the Court found entrapment as a
matter of law. Id. at 373. As in Sorrells, the government's agent testified regarding the solicitation,
but here his testimony was undisputed. The defendant and the government informer were both
being treated for narcotics addiction by the same
physician. The informer asked the defendant on
numerous occasions if he would supply him with
narcotics, and he finally acquiesced, providing the

victed for the manufacture and sale of narcotics. The government agent's contribution of a
legal, but scarce, ingredient in the manufacture
of methamphetamine, which was then sold to
the agent, was held to make no difference in
the application of the predisposition test.4 Beinformer several times. Sales were made at cost
plus expenses. This lack of profit motive was of
assistance to the defendant on review of his arrest
and conviction.
The Court found error in the submission of the
issue of entrapment to the jury:
We conclude from the evidence that entrapment was established as a matter of law. In
so holding, we are not choosing between conflicting witnesses, nor judging credibility.
Aside from recalling [the government informer], who was the Government's witness,
the defense called no witnesses. We reach our
conclusion from the undisputed testimony of
the prosecution's witnesses.
Id. at 373. In addition, there was no evidence of
predisposition presented; a nine-year-old sales conviction and five-year-old possession conviction
were held insufficient to prove readiness or predisposition at the time of solicitation.
4 The Court explicitly refused to overrule the
primacy of the Sorrells/Sherman predisposition
test for the availability of the entrapment defense,
adding that ".. Congress may address itself to the
question and adopt any substantive definition of the
defense that it may find desirable." 411 U.S. at 433.
The entrapment defense has been held by the Supreme Court to be mandated by judicial interpretation of Congressional (legislative) intent: Congress, the Court reasoned, must have had the
purpose in mind when enacting criminal legislation
of convicting only those people who have acted of
their own volition. Sorrells v. United States, 287
U.S. 435, 448 (1932). See also United States v.
Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973); Note, Entrapeient: Sorrells to Russell, 49 No=R DAME LAW.
579, 585-87 (1974).
Legislation which expressly defines entrapment
is currently in the Senate judiciary committee, as
part of the comprehensive Criminal Justice Reform
Act:
§ 551 Unlawful Entrapment.
It is a defense to prosecution under any federal statute that the defendant was not predisposed to commit the offense charged and did
so solely as a result of active inducement by a
federal public servant acting in his own official
capacity or by a person acting as an agent of
such a public servant or of a federal agency.
The employment of strategem or deception, or
the provision of a facility or an opportunity
for commission of an offense, or the failure to
foreclose such an opportunity, or mere solicitation that would not induce an ordinary law-
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cause the government showed, contrary to defense testimony, that the defendant was ready
and willing to commit the crime at the time of
the agent's contact with him, the Court held
that the defense of entrapment was properly a
jury issue and upheld the jury's denial of the
defense.5
In addition, the defendant's second ground
for reversal, that the government's agent was
so "intolerably" involved in the illegal manufacture of methamphetamine that the dismissal
of the prosecution was mandated, was rejected
because the government-contributed ingredient
was not impossible to obtain, and its possession
was legal.6 The Russell Court labelled this second ground as a new defense which rested on
two theories. One theory suggested a finding
of entrapment as a matter of law, regardless of
predisposition, in two types of cases: (1)
abiding persont to commit an offense, does not
in itself constitute unlawful entrapment.
(emphasis
S.1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975)
added). The first sentence reaffirms the importance
of the predisposition test for availability of the entrapment defense, but the addition of the second
sentence causes some confusion. This bill may arguably label as entrapment conduct which would
induce an ordinary law-abiding person, thus adopting the objective judicial policy test which focuses
on the government conduct, rather than the intent
of the defendant. See note 13 and accompanying
text infra.
5 The issue of entrapment is usually one for the
jury, because the defendant's evidence of solicitation and the government's evidence of the defendant's predisposition must be evaluated for weight
and credibility:
[T]he Courts of Appeals have since Sorrells
unanimously concluded that unless it can be
decided as a matter of law, the issue of
whether a defendant has been entrapped is for
the jury as part of its function of determining
the guilt or innocence of the accused.
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 377
(1958). The judge will rule that there is entrapment as a matter of law if there is no evidence of
predisposition and the evidence establishing solicitation comes from government witnesses. Id. at
373. Some courts have also held that entrapment
at law exists when there is no evidence of predisposition and the defendant's evidence of solicitation
is unrebutted. See note 32 and accompanying text
infra.
6 Mr. justice Rehnquist noted in the opinion of
the Court:
While we may some day be presented with a
situation in which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process
principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain
a conviction, [citation omitted], the instant
case is distinctly not of that breed.
411 U.S. at 431-32.
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whenever the government supplies the contraband, the defendant sells the contraband to a
government agent, and the arrest is for possession, handling; and sale, as in United States v.
Bueno,7 or (2) whenever the government supplies the contraband, and the arrest is for possession with intent to distribute, as in United
States v. Chisuin.s The second theory was a ra7 447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 949 (1973). A government informer supplied
the predisposed defendant, a narcotics addict, with
heroin which the defendant then sold to undercover agents. Entrapment was established as a
matter of law, and the conviction was reversed because the government did not meet the requirement, established by the Fifth Circuit, of contradicting the defendant's testimony in order to
submit the issue to the jury. The court did not
allow the government to prevail by resting its case
on a challenge to the defendant's credibility. After
conviction on remand, the Fifth Circuit affirmed
because the government had produced witnesses,
including the informer-supplier, who contradicted
the defendant's testimony as to entrapment, and
whom the jury chose to believe. 470 F.2d 154, 155
(5th Cir. 1972).
8 312 F. Supp. 1307 (C.D. Cal. 1970). The undisputed facts showed that the defendant had approached a reputed counterfeiter with the intent to
buy and pass counterfeit money. The counterfeiter
then contacted the Secret Service, and a government agent was introduced to the defendant as the
counterfeiter's associate. The agent provided the
defendant with the money and arrested him for receiving counterfeit bills with the intent to pass
them as genuine. The court found entrapment as a
matter of law, with its justification in due process
considerations, and granted the motion to dismiss
the indictment, notwithstanding the defendant's
predisposition:
Were the courts to sanction the law enforcement activities committed in this case, it
would transform the laws designed to promote
the general welfare into a technique aimed at
manufacturing disobedience in order to punish,
a concept thoroughly repugnant to constitutional principles. When the government supplies the contraband, the receipt of which is illegal, the government cannot be permitted to
punish the one receiving it. To permit the
government to do so would be to countenance
violations of justice.
Id. at 1312. Although the government was the
source of the contraband, the alleged crime was
not sale, but possession with specific intent to distribute. The fact pattern differs from the Bueno
conduit case because there was no second government agent to receive the illegal goods. See text
accompanying note 19 infra.
Because most of the courts have been confronted
with cases based on arrests for sale, not just possession, the conduit rule of Bueno has been more
readily used, and the applicability of Chisum seems
to have been limited to its facts. Attempts to use
the reasoning of the case in federal courts have
been overturved on review. See, e.g., United States
v. McGrath, 468 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972), va-
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tionale based on excessive involvement of the
government investigator in the criminal activity.
The Court did not initially present separate discussions based on the labels used; rather it accepted the lower court's determination that
both theories are based on " . . . fundamental
concepts of due process and evince the reluctance of the judiciary to countenance 'overzealous law enforcement.'" 1 It was not until later
in the opinion that the Court discussed, and
rejected, Russell's reliance on judicial policy as
establishing the defense.10
The requirements for the defense of entrapment were not changed by Russell; the predisposition test of Sherman and Sorrells continues to be universally accepted, except when
there is government involvement in the supplying of contraband. The circuits remain in conflict regarding the evidence required to successfully present the type of due process or
judicial policy arguments noted in Russell, regardless of the results of the predisposition
test.
Before entering into a discussion of the recent case law regarding entrapment, it is essential to enumerate the justifications for the
entrapment defense, and note those which were
explicitly affirmed in Russell. There are three
cated, 412 U.S. 936 (1973) ; United States v. Russell, 459 F2d 671 (9th Cir. 1972), reV'd, 411 U.S.
423 (1973). Cf. United States v. Mahoney, 355 F.
Supp. 418 ,E.D. La. 1973), where the court denied
the defendant's motion to dismiss but did say that
it agreed with the holding of Chisum. The court
said that case might be applicable to establish
entrapment unless the government could show
that the person to whom a seaman, who decided to
work with customs agents after receiving his supply of marijuana, delivered the contraband was the
intended recipient of the drug shipment. Because
the facts of this case arguably fit the Bueno conduit situation, the court's agreement with Chisum
may be dictum.
9 411 U.S. at 428, quoting United States v. Russell, 459 F.2d 671, 674 (9th Cir. 1972). See also 411
U.S. at 430. The Court was again using the fifth
amendment due process clause as a means of balancing the conduct of the government against general standards of "fundamental fairness" and
"shocking to the universal sense of justice." Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S.
234, 246 (1960). See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455,
462 (1942); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,
71-72 (1932). Needless to say, the standards
which have been used in applying this balancing
test are subjective and vague, contributing to the
confusion in applying the rule.
10 411 U.S. at 433-35.

sources of the entrapment defense which have
been categorized by the commentators:" (1)
legislative intent, as outlined in the majority
opinions of Sherman, Sorrells, and Russell, 2
(2) judicial policy, as proposed in the concurring opinions in Sherman and Sorrells,13 and
(3) constitutional due process notions, as referred to in Russell by Mr. Justice Rehnquist's
majority opinion. 14 The Russell Court both
recognized the legislative intent justification,
and said that there may come a time when the
government conduct would be so outrageous
that a defense could be developed based upon
due process considerations. Moreover, even
though it refused to sanction the non-constitutionally-based objective test of the concurring
opinions of Sorrells and Sherman, which would
allow the judiciary a "chancellor's foot" veto
over law enforcement practices, 5 the Court was
not presented with, nor did it comment upon,
the fact pattern in which the government is
involved as source and purchaser of the contraband, with the defendant as the seller/middleman.
Although it could foresee the application of
due process principles to police conduct, the
Russell Court would not allow a reconsidera11 E.g., Note, Criminal Law-Entrapment-Predisposition of Defendant Crucial Factorin Entrapment Defense, 59 CORNEL L. REv. 546, 557-62
(1974); Note, The Viability of the Entrapment
Defense in the Constitutional Context, 59 IowA
L. REv. 655, 663-65 (1974) ; Note, Elevation of
Entrapment to a ConstitutionalDefense, 7 U. MIcH.
J.L. IEFORM 361, 364-69 (1974).
12 We are unable to conclude that it was the
intention of the Congress in enacting this statute that its processes of detection and enforcement should be abused by the instigation by
government officials of an act on the part of
persons otherwise innocent in order to lure
them to its commission and to punish them.
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 448
(1932). See also Russell v. United States, 411
U.S. 423 433 435 (1973); Sherman v. United
States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958).
:13 The doctrine rests, rather, on a fundamental
rule of public policy. The protection of its
own functions and the preservation of the purity of its own temple belongs only to the
court. It is the province of the court and of
the court alone to protect itself and the government from such prostitution of the criminal
law.
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 457
(1932) (Roberts, J., concurring). Cf. Sherman v.
United States, 356 U.S. 369, 379 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
14See note 6 supra.
'5411 U.S. at 434-35.
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tion of the basis for the entrapment defense in
that case through comparison with the constitutional rationale for the exclusionary rule as
applied to illegal searches and seizures and
confessions. The analogy was "imperfect," the
Court said, because the real basis for the exclusionary rule was the government's "failure
to observe its own laws." 16 The agent's conduct in Russell did not violate any law, nor
did it affront an independent constitutional
right of the defendant.
The Court effectively left open the situation
in which the undercover agents did engage in
illegal conduct, such as the sale of contraband.
Even if such conduct would not fall under the
proscription of an individual constitutional
right, and thus compel the court's criticism, the
court would arguably have the discretion to
condemn the unlawful police conduct on a judicial policy basis. This justification for the
entrapment rule produces an objective test
which focuses on the actions of the government regardless of the criminal inclinations of
the defendant, just as the operation of the exclusionary rule does not depend on the guilt or
innocence of the defendant. Rather it is a use
of the rationale of the concurring opinions in
Sherman and Sorrell: Such actions should not
be permitted, not because the defendant's due
process rights have been violated, but because
the police, as those who must uphold law and
order, should not be allowed to break the laws,
in an attempt to catch alleged criminals.
Prior to Russell, the Fifth Circuit in
Bueno,1 7 arguably used judicial policy as a
basis for entrapment at law 8 in defining its
"conduit rule": that entrapment is established
as a matter of law whenever the uncontradicted testimony of the defendant demonstrates
that an informer furnished contraband to the
defendant, regardless of his predisposition, and
he then sold it to another government agent.
This conduit theory, which covers the fact sit-
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uations in which the defendant was merely the
means of transmitting illegal substances from
one hand of the government to the other, has
also been affirmed by the Fifth Circuit subsequent to the Russell decision.19

19 United States v. Gomez-Rojas, 507 F.2d 1213,
1218 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W.
3201 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1975) (defendant's claim that the
government informer was the source of his marijuana would, if proven, suffice as entrapment at
law, even if the informer did not receive the marijuana from the government); United States v.
Mosley, 496 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir.), aff'd on
rehearing, 505 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1974) (when
contradictory testimony exists as to the source
of the contraband sold by the defendant, the issue
of entrapment should properly be submitted to
the jury, even though the defendant was found
to be predisposed; in short, defendant may be
acquitted, even though disposed, when the undercover agent supplies him with the contraband);
United States v. Oquendo, 490 F.2d 161, 163 (5th
Cir. 1974) (once defendant has assumed his burden
of going forth with evidence that the government
was the source of his contraband, the government
has the burden of showing beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant did not obtain the contraband from the informer) ; United States v. Workopich, 479 F.2d 1142, 1144-45 (5th Cir. 1973) (government's conduct of soliciting defendant and
supplying legal currency to enable him to purchase
heroin was not entrapment at law because the currency supplied was legal, not contraband, and the
defendant did not obtain the heroin from a government agent, and then sell it to another, i.e, there
was no conduit).
A limit has been placed on the application of the
conduit rule by United States v. Rodriguez, 474
F.2d 587, 589 (5th Cir. 1973), which held that
when the prospective seller (defendant) received
cocaine from his brother, who in turn received it
from a government informer, entrapment at law
was not established because the government source
was one step removed.
The Fifth Circuit has also constrained the opportunity of the defendant to raise the constitutional defense of outrageous government conduct,
which was based on Russell. United States v.
Arias-Diaz, 497 F.2d 165, 169 (5th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1003 (1975). The defendants
had a source of marijuana in Columbia and paid
the undercover agent to fly there and pick it up.
The defendants were arrested near the airport,
after they had received the marijuana from the
agent, and were charged with possession. No
constitutionally offensive government involvement
or entrapment at law was found.
16 Id. at 430.
In spite of these limitations, a three-judge panel
17 447 F.2d at 903.
of the Fifth Circuit has unanimously stated:
1s The decision of the court in Bueno does not
"Thus the law of this Circuit is that a defendant,
mention that the finding of entrapment at law is where entrapment is an issue, may be acquitted for
constitutionally based. Commentators have agreed lack of predisposition, or, even though disposed,
that the holding of Bueno is not founded in due where the undercover agent supplies him with the
process, but rather in judicial policy. See, e.g., contraband." United States v. Mosley, supra at
Note, Elevation of Entrapment to a Constitutional 1016. Although the court does not explicitly state
Defense, 7 U. MIcHr. J.L. REFORm 361, 372-73 that the contraband must then be sold to a government agent to complete the conduit, this can be
(1974).
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Until recently, the other circuits had followed Russell strictly, using the predisposition
of the defendant as the basis for determining
whether the defense of entrapment could be
used. 20 Now, however, the Third Circuit has
sanctioned the Fifth Circuit case law with the
holding in United States v. West 21 that entrapment was proven under the Bueno conduit rule
as well as under the Russell predisposition test.
West was a heroin pusher who, as the government admitted, had no history of previous
involvement in narcotics distribution. The majority found two grounds for reversing the
lower court's conviction of West. First, there
was not adequate proof of West's predisposition to sell heroin. He had been gainfully employed and the prosecution conceded that he
was a first-time offender. Moreover, the four
transactions with government agents within a
ten-day period were all part of a scheme proposed by the government agent, and thus the
first sale could not be used to show a predisposition for the next three transactions.22
Second, the case was definitely of the Bueno
genre: uncontradicted evidence showed that
one government agent secured the heroin
which the defendant later sold to another govinferred from the facts of that case and the cases
which the court cited. Id. at 1014, 1016. Mosley alleged that a government agent had provided him
with the heroin which he then sold to an undercover agent. His conviction was reversed because
the trial court denied the request for a Bueiw-type
instruction, even though the jury found the defendant to be predisposed.
20 See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 508 F2d
1157, 1159 (7th Cir., cert. denied, 421 U.S. 980
(1975) (Marshall & Stewart, JJ., dissenting);
United States v. Quintana, 508 F.2d 867, 876-78
(7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Jett, 491 F.2d
1078, 1081 (1st Cir. 1974). The Tenth Circuit used
the strict predisposition test even before the
Supreme Court decided Russell. Martinez v. United
States, 373 F.2d 810, 812 (10th Cir. 1967). Other
courts strongly disagreed with the primacy of the
predisposition test, also before Russell. United
States v. Chisum, 312 F. Supp. 1307, 1311-12 (C.D.
Cal. 1970); People v. Strong, 21 111. 2d 320, 323,
172 N.E.2d 765, 768 (1961).
21 511 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975). The Third Circuit law prior to West contained the general rule
that entrapment occurs only when the criminal
conduct was the product of the creative activity
(inducement) of law enforcement officials upon an
innocent person, i.e., if the defendant is predisposed to commit the crime, he cannot use the entrapment defense. United States v. Silver, 457 F.2d
1217, 1219 (3d Cir. 1972).
22 511 F.2d at 1086.

ernment agent. 23 The defendant's involvement
appeared to be limited to accepting and carrying out one agent's proposal to sell the overcut
or fake heroin. The court explicitly approved
of the Bueno and Mosley decisions of the Fifth
Circuit,2 4 yet it did not mention entrapment at
law or due [process. Its justification for the
conduit rule arguably is founded in notions of
the social objectives of law enforcement, summarized by a holding that the conduct of the
government was intolerable:
But when the government's own agent has set
the accused up in illicit activity by supplying
him with narcotics and then introducing him
to another government agent as a prospective
buyer, the role of the government has passed
the point of toleration. Moreover, such conduct . . . serves no justifying social objective.
Rather, it puts the law enforcement authorities
in the position of creating new crime....
[W]e view West's case as one of intolerable
conduct by government agents, one supplying
and the other buying the narcotics .... 25
Although the adoption of the Bueno rule may
be read as dictum in this case, it may be the
harbinger of a significant trend in that it is
the first non-Fifth Circuit opinion after Russell
to accept the conduit theory.
The dissent in West argued that because of
a procedural deficiency the court should not
find entrapment as a matter of law.2 6 Although
the government did not rebut the defense testimony regarding the governmental source of
the contraband, Judge Weis, citing Masciale
v. United States,2 7 would have allowed the
trial court to judge the weight and credibility
of the defendant's testimony in deciding
This case is unusual in that the uncontradicted evidence shows a confederation of two
government agents, one an informer who, according to uncontradicted testimony, actually
supplied the narcotics in question and the
other an undercover officer who, as prearranged with the informer, bought this contraband from the accused third person whom the
informer had persuaded to join with him in a
selling venture.
Id. at 1085.
24 Id. See notes 7 and 19 supra.
25 511 F.2d at 1085-86.
261d. at 1088-89 (Weis, J., dissenting).
27 356 U.S. 386, 388 (1958),
aff'g 236 F.2d 601
(2d Cir. 1956), rehearing denied, 357 U.S. 933
(1958).
23

COMMENTS
whether the entrapment defense should be allowed. The majority attempted to distinguish
Masciale on the basis that there was contradictory, albeit indirect, government testimony regarding inducement in that case. Yet a close
reading of the language of the Court indicates
28
otherwise.
28 Two agents were involved in Masciale, but on
the same side of the transaction-as buyers, not
sellers. The defendant had conceded that the jury
could have found that he was predisposed when he
met the second agent, on the strength of his boasting of knowledge of someone "high up in the narcotics traffic." 356 U.S. at 388. Yet the government did not contradict Masciale's testimony
regarding the inducement of the first government
agent, whom he met prior to his announcement of
predisposition to the second agent. 236 F.2d at
602-03. The Supreme Court held:
Petitioner argues that this undisputed testimony explained why he was willing to deal
with [the second government agent] and so
established entrapment as a matter of law.
However, this testimony alone could not have
this effect. While petitioner presented enough
evidence for the jury to consider, they were
entitled to disbelieve him in regard to [the
first government agent-informer] and so find
for the Government on the issue of guilt.
Therefore, the trial court properly submitted
the case to the jury.
356 U.S. at 388.
In fact, the First Circuit in United States v.
Jett, 491 F.2d 1078, 1080 n.3 (1st Cir. 1974) had
previously accused the Fifth Circuit of falling
short in its analysis by failing to take notice of
Masciale when it held in Bueio that the government had the burden of introducing evidence to directly contradict the defendant's testimony in a
conduit situation. In Jett the court did find substantial evidence warranting a finding of predisposition, and thus did not reach the Masciale question, since the defendant's evidence in Jett was
contradicted by the government.
The Fifth Circuit did review the procedural rule
of Masciale in United States v. Workopich, 479
F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1973), and made the general
statement:
Thus, when the undisputed testimony of a defendant is the sole basis for an entrapment defense, entrapment is not established as a matter of law but rather is an issue for the jury
to decide. Accord, United States v. Burgess, 5
Cir. 1970, 433 F.2d 987. Cf. United States v.
Bueno, 5 Cir. 1971, 447 F.2d 903, where, when
the government supplied contraband to the defendant, his uncontradicted testimony established entrapment as a matter of law.
rd. at 1146. Even though this quote does not explicitly mention the conduit situation, it must be
understood that in Bueito the government-supplied
contraband was then sold to a government agent.
Therefore, this citation of Bueno seems to establish a different procedural rule (from Masciale)
when the conduit theory is alleged. The procedural
rule noted in Bueno could not be used in the
Workopich case because the facts establishing the
Bueno conduit situation were not shown.

[Vol. 66

The real problem in interpreting Masciale is
that it is difficult to ascertain whether the decision states a general rule of law, or merely indicates that the defendant's evidence in that
case was deficient per se because it was inferential and sketchy. 29 Some courts have held
that, following Masciale, the defense is not established as a matter of law when the only evidence of entrapment is the defendant's own
testimony.30 The Fifth Circuit subscribes to
that general rule in most cases 3 ' but carves out
In addition, the Burgess case cited in the quote
also involved, like Workopich, a non-conduit fact
situation, in which predisposition was the key
issue. The untaxed liquor which the defendant sold
to the undercover agent was not obtained from the
government. The agent had pleaded with the defendant to sell him whiskey so that he could resell
it to obtain money for his allegedly ill and hungry
family. The court, in a per curiam decision, upheld
the jury's decision to believe the government's evidence of no entrapment, without stating the nature
of that convincing evidence. United States v.
Burgess, 433 F.2d 987, 988 (5th Cir. 1970) (per
curiam).
This somewhat ambiguous language in Workopich was clarified in United States v. Gomez-Rojas, 507 F.2d 1213 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
44 U.S.L.W. 3201 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1975), in which the
court affirmed the existence of the different procedural rule to be used with the conduit theory,
without specifically mentioning Masciale. Although
the evidence in the trial court was sufficient to go
to the jury because the government contradicted
the defendant's evidence on the source of the contraband, and the defendant's conviction was reversed because of an erroneous jury instruction,
the court said in its analysis:
[I]f the defendant establishes a prima facie
case of a transaction of the Bueno variety,
then the Government must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the objective facts necessary to a Bueiw defense did not occur. Once
the Government comes forward with evidence
that the defendant was not entrapped, then the
case may go to the jury. United States v.
Oquendo, supra.
In an ordinary entrapment case, the Government will seek to demonstrate the defendant's
predisposition by pointing to the defendant's
conduct and to his reputation for dealing in
contraband. See United States v. Russell,
supra. In a Bueno-type case, however, the Government's task is more difficult. It may not
rely solely on the jury's decision to believe or
not to believe the defendant's story.
Id. at 1218.
29 United States v. Masciale, 236 F.2d 601, 603
(2d Cir. 1956), aff'd, 356 U.S. 386 (1958).
30 E.g., United States v. Johnson, 495 F.2d 242,
244 (10th Cir. 1974) (defendant claims that informer supplied him with contraband); United
States v. Jett, 491 F.2d 1078, 1080 (1st Cir. 1974)
(dictum).
31 United States v. Burgess, 433 F.2d 987, 988
(5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam).
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an exception when the government supplies
contraband to the defendant who later sells it
to a government agent. "In a Bueno-type case
. . . [the government] may not rely solely on
the jury's decision to believe or not to believe
the defendant's story." 32
Two other circuits have recently followed
the predisposition test only. The Eighth Circuit expressly rejected the Bueno rule in
United States v. Hampton.33 In United States
v. Spivey34 the government's illegal conduct
was found not to be violative of the due process test as outlined by Mr. Justice Rehnquist
in RusseU.
Hampton allegedly proposed a plan to sell a
"pollutant"-a non-narcotic closely resembling
heroin in appearance-to gullible acquaintances
of a government informer. However, the informer then supplied heroin to Hampton, who
sold the narcotics to undercover agents posing
as friends of the informer. Hampton claimed
that he mistakenly believed that the heroin was
the alleged pollutant.35
The facts of this case seemed to compel the
application of the Buenw rule: although the defendant was allegedly predisposed, he had testified that the government agent supplied him
with the contraband. But the court said: "We
believe that the Supreme Court's opinion in
Russell forecloses us from considering any
theory other than predisposition with respect
to Hampton's entrapment defense." 3 6 The
court did not clearly enunciate the basis for
the entrapment doctrine which the defendant
suggested as a defense, but the defendant, in
his appeal, stated that his "government conduct
3
2United States v. Gomez-Rojas, 507 F.2d 1213,
1218 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W.
3201 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1975). See note 28 supra.
33507 F.2d 832, 834-36. (8th Cir. 1974), cert.
granted, 420 U.S. 1003 (1975). Question presented:
"Does Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause bar
,defendant's conviction for selling contraband supplied by Government?" 43 U.S.L.W. 3562 (U.S.
Apr. 15, 1975).
34 508 F.2d 146 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
949 (1975).
35 The jury accepted the testimony of the government informer that Hampton knew that he was
selling heroin. 507 F2d at 836 n.4.
36 Id. at 835. Judge Heaney strongly dissented
on the grounds that this Bueno situation, in which
"'...the government buy[s] heroin from itself,
through an intermediary, the defendant, and then
charges] him with the crime.
is the type of
outrageous conduct which Mr. Justice Rehnquist

theory" had its origins in the concurring opinions of SorrelUs and Sherman.37 The court's silence on the source of Hampton's defense is
tantamount to agreement that the defense has
judicial policy as at least one of its justifications. The Hampton opinion thus precludes the
application of the Bueno rule in the Eighth
Circuit, if the defense contends that the rule is
based on judicial policy.
It would seem that the court's ambiguity
could arguably allow the government'conduct
defense to be raised if due process notions
were presented as its justification. But in light
of the rationale of the cases cited by the majority as controlling, and the closing criticism
of the dissenting judge,38 a due process argument based on the conduit fact pattern is also
foreclosed.
Judge Bright's majority opinion viewed the
Supreme Court's remand of United States v.
McGrath to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,3 9 and the subsequent affirmance
of the conviction for failure to establish, in the
record or briefs, either the defense of entrapment or of outrageous government conduct
which affronted due process principles, 40 as
undermining the validity of the Bueno holding.41- The conviction in McGrath was not
only for conspiracy to produce and pass counterfeit obligations, to which the entrapment defense was not applicable because the defendants
initiated the conspiracy, but also for unlawful
possession of the currency. Regarding the latter count, the court found that the government
agents arranged for and supervised the printing of the bills, and then delivered them to the
defendant. 42 Such involvement of the governin Russell recognized would be violative of due
process requirements. Id. at 837 (Heaney, J., dissenting), quoting United States v.Bueno, 447 F.2d
903, 905 (5th Cir. 1971).
37 507 F2d at 834.
38 In the future, itisdifficult to see how any
defendant inthis Circuit can possibly raise the
due process defense which the Russell Court
sought to leave open.
Id. at 837 (Heaney,J., dissenting).
39412 U.S. 936 (1973), vacating 468 F.2d 1027
(7th Cir. 1972). The Court remanded for further
consideration inlight of United States v.Russell,
411 U.S. 423 (1973).
40 494 F.2d 562,563 (7th Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
41 507 F.2d at 835-36.
42 The court recognized the trial court's findings
as follows:

COMMENTS
ment agents in McGrath would seem to be
even greater than that in Bueno or Hampton
where the government was only the source of
the contraband, not the mastermind for its
manufacture. In light of the influential precedents of Russell and McGrath, the court would
not allow an entrapment defense based on government conduct, either because of judicial policy or due process notions, but rather held the
defendant's predisposition determinative in denying the defense and upholding his conviction.
The Tenth Circuit, which has previously indicated that absence of predisposition is the
key requirement for allowing an entrapment
defense, 43 demonstrated how difficult it is to
establish that the government conduct was a
denial of fundamental fairness guarantees of
the due process clause. In United States v.
Spivey,4 4 the government informer violated
both federal and state criminal statutes by possessing and giving the defendant marijuana in
an attempt to obtain his trust and confidence.
He was also generous with his home, food, and
money.4 5 However, the defendant, a "ready
and willing seller of heroin," 46 had independent sources of heroin, and sold it on two separate occasions to government agents, out of the
presence of the informer. The court definitely
concluded that the illegality of the informer's
conduct, without more, did not affront due
The Government's proof demonstrated that the
defendant, with the assistance of several other
persons, embarked upon a scheme to print
over one million dollars in counterfeit twenty
dollar bills. At some point in the scheme, the
Secret Service discovered the plan. Agents
then infiltrated the defendant's conspiracy and
effectively took direction of it. Prior to this
point, the evidence shows that the defendant
had purchased rag paper and ink of the type
and color necessary to duplicate paper currency and had made inquiries about a printer.
There is little dispute, however, that once the
agents had infiltrated the ring, they exercised
substantial control over its course. Not only
did they arrange for and supervise the actual
printing of the counterfeit bills, but they also
determined how and when they would be delivered to the defendant.
468 F.2d at 1028.
43 Martinez v. United States, 373 F.2d 810, 812
(10th Cir. 1967).
44 508 F.2d 146 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
949 (1975).
45 Id. at 148.
46 Id. at 151.
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process principles.4 7 Therefore it did not allow
the defendant to claim the Russell-originated
constitutional defense of outrageous government conduct; yet it did not give any objective
standards to test the availability of the due
process arguments.
The more compelling aspect of this Tenth
Circuit opinion is the statement that the government's conduct was not ". . . postured as
connected in some way to the commission of
the acts for which the defendant stands
convicted." 4 The government conduct was
allegedly limited to providing a home, food,
marijuana, and money to the defendant, and
introducing him to the government agentpurchasers. The defendant conducted the sales
by himself, was not threatened or coerced
by the agents, and did not act pursuant to a
governmental design. As the Tenth Circuit
concluded, illegal government conduct is not
enough to constitute entrapment at law on constitutional grounds, when there is no nexus to
the allegedly criminal activity of the defendant.
But if such a connection could be shown, the
court inferred that it would entertain the argument:
[T]he more immediate the impact of the government's conduct upon the particular defendant, the more vigorously would be applied
40
Russell's test for constitutional impropriety.
Thus it may be possible for a defendant in the
Tenth Circuit to successfully present a due
process defense if it is within the context of the
conduit fact pattern, where the impact of the
government conduct is to provide him with the
contraband, the sale of which will lead to his
arrest.50
The effect of these opinions is an acknowledgment of the willingness of some circuits to
47 Nevertheless, Russell did not establish-nor
does it now require us to formulate-a fixed
rule that would preclude, for due process reasons, the prosecution of the defendant here
because the government's informer engaged in
unlawful conduct.
Id. at 149. For Russell's acknowledgment of the
possibility of due process violations in this context
see note 6 supra.
48
49 508 F.2d at 149.
Id. at 150.
50 The Spivey court leaves this possibility open
when it cites the Bueno and other Fifth Circuit
"government-supplied contraband" cases in a footnote as an example of cases in which the govern-
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use an objective test to determine the availabilPublic confidence in the fair and honorable
administration of justice, upon which ultiity of the entrapment defense, by focusing on
mately depends the rule of law, is the tranthe law enforcement conduct, and justifying
scending value at stake.
the defense in either judicial policy or due
process notions. On the other hand, the majorNo matter what the defendant's past record
ity of the circuits still require the use of the
and present inclinations to criminality, or the
subjective test of the intent of the defendantdepths to which he has sunk in the estimation
his predisposition-and see the Russell case as
of society, certain police conduct to ensnare
a bar to asserting entrapment or intolerable
him into further crime is not to be tolerated
52
conduct in the Bueno situation where the deby an advanced society.
fendant is predisposed to commit the crime. It
GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE
remains for the Supreme Court to provide
guidance by deciding whether the "intolerable"
In the post-Watergate era, public attention
government conduct by reason of the conduit has focused as never before on the purported
situation is enough to reverse the defendant's
attempts of various government bodies to spy
conviction, even though he probably would on private citizens. In several major cities, for
have committed the crime without the govern- example, reports of police intelligence gatherment's assistance in becoming his source of the ing, directed at political enemies of parties in
contraband. In addition the Court has yet to power, have filled the news media,53 causing
provide standards for application of the outra- citizens concerned about the prying eye of "Big
Brother" to ask if a solution to the problem of
geous government conduct/due process test
outlined in Russell. Perhaps these will be pro- government surveillance can be found in the law.
In White v. Davis,5 4 the California Supreme
vided when Hampton is decided by the Supreme
5
Court on review. ' In the absence of the latter Court held that a state and local taxpayer had
standards, the Fifth Circuit seems to be con- the requisite standing to seek an injunction
tent to continue to reaffirm that the conduit against alleged illegal expenditures of public
fact pattern affronts its judicial concepts of funds by a chief of police in connection with
fairness and proper police action.
police undercover activities at the University
An expansion of this rationale into the other of California at Los Angeles.55 Observing that
circuits, commencing with the West case in the the campus is the "sacred ground of free
Third Circuit, is desirable, and this rule, based discussion," 5 6 the court also found that facts
alleged by the plaintiff showed a prima facie
on judicial policy, is the clearest path of action
which has been charted, in the absence of con- violation of constitutional guarantees of free
stitutional due process standards, for courts speech and assembly5 7 and the right of privacy
who want to justify their finding of outrageous
or intolerable government conduct in a conduit
52 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 380,
situation. Without any necessity for correlating 382-83
(1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
53 See, e.g., Chicago Tribune, June 4, 1975, § 1,
a criticism of the conduct of the police to concol. 4.
stitutional notions, the courts should be at lib- at 541,13
Cal. 3d 757, 533 P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94
erty to make the determination that certain po- (1975).
lice conduct is not proper, regardless of the
55 Id. at 762-65, 533 P.2d at 225-27, 120 Cal.
person to whom it is directed. Mr. Justice Rptr. at 97-99. This state and local taxpayer standing would apparently not allow suits against federal
Frankfurter, in his concurring opinion in officers to prevent expenditure of federal funds.
Sherman, convincingly summarized the import Such suits would require federal taxpayer standing
to attack surveillance, which so far does not exist.
of this argument:
For the most extensive grant of federal taxpayer
standing to date see Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83
(1968).
56 Id. at 770, 533 P.2d at 231, 120 Cal. Rptr. at
ment connection has been measured by "...
the 103.
extent to which the government instigated, partici57 Id. at 765-73, 533 P.2d at 227-32, 120 Cal.
pated in, or was involved or enmeshed in, the Rptr. at 99-104. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I provides:
criminal activity itself." Id. at 150 n.3 and accomCongress shall make no law respecting an
panying text.
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
51 See note 33 supra.
free exercise thereof; or abridging the free-
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set forth in a recently adopted provision of the dents, attending classes, and submitting reports
California Constitution. 58 Since the Supreme of class discussions to the police department. 65
Court of the United States in Laird v.
With the federal courts effectively closed to
Taturn 59 held that a citizen cannot, without suits by citizens challenging the mere existence
specific injury, challenge in federal courts the of illegal surveillance, Hayden White, a pro60
legality of government investigative activity,
fessor at U.C.L.A., took his taxpayer's suit
California may now, for the first time, be set- against the Los Angeles chief of police to the
ting an example which other states will follow
California state courts. On appeal from a disin providing an effective remedy for the gen- missal of the complaint, the state supreme
eral public against much undesired government
court applied section 526a of the California
snooping.
Code of Civil Procedure to grant standing,6"
In Laird, plaintiffs, alleging the existence of noting that the same provision was used to
covert United States Army intelligence-gatherconfer standing in 1948 on a taxpayer chaling operations directed at lawful civilian politi- lenging dragnet police blockades67 and in 1957
cal activity, sought to enjoin the alleged
on a taxpayer seeking a remedy for illegal
spying because it had a "chilling effect," which electronic surveillance by police.68 The court
discouraged them from exercising their first held that under section 526a no showing of
amendment rights.6 ' A five-man majority for special damage to the taxpayer is necessary
the Court held that a citizen must allege a when he challenges state or local government
more specific injury than mere surveillance to action, the primary purpose of the section
62
challenge such government activities.
being "'to enable a large body of the citizenry
6
In Bagley v. Los Angeles, 3 a California
to challenge governmental action which would
federal court followed the Laird prece- otherwise go unchallenged in the courts bedent in dismissing a complaint challenging the cause of the standing requirement.' "69
very police surveillance activities at issue in
By holding that White had standing as a
White v. Davis.64 As in White, the plaintiff al- taxpayer to seek an injunction against the exleged that members of the Los Angeles police penditure of public funds for illegal purposes
department, with the chief's authorization, by state or local officials, the California Suwere serving as secret informers and under- preme Court blazed a trail which courts in
cover agents at U.C.L.A. by registering as stuother states could easily follow to curb government snooping. Taxpayers' suits have been recognized as a common law right in some
dom of speech, or of the press; or the right
states.7 0 Other American jurisdictions have
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
statutes similar to section 526a of the Califorpetition the Government for a redress of
grievances.
The provisions of the first amendment are applica65 Id. at 761-62, 764, 533 P.2d at 225, 226, 120
ble to the states by reason of the fourteenth Cal. Rptr. at 97, 98.
amendment. National Association for the Advance6 Id. at 764, 533 P.2d at 227, 120 Cal. Rptr. at
ment of Colored People v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 99. Relevant portions of section 526a provide:
460-61 (1958); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697,
An action to obtain a judgment, restraining
707 (1931). CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 2 contains a simiand preventing any illegal expenditure of ...
lar provision for freedom of speech and assembly.
funds . . . of a county, town, city or city and
5 13 Cal. 3d at 773-76, 533 P.2d at 232-35, 120
county of the state, may be maintained against
Cal. Rptr. at 104-07. CAL. CoNsT. art. 1, § 1
any officer thereof . . . by a citizen resident
reads :
therein....
All people are by nature free and independent
CAL. CiV. PRO. CODE § 526a (West 1954).
and have inalienable rights. Among these are
67 Wirin v. Horrall, 85 Cal. App. 2d 497, 193
enjoying and defending life and liberty, acP.2d 470 (1948).
quiring, possessing, and protecting property,
68 Wirin v. Parker, 48 Cal. 2d 890, 313 P.2d 844
and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness,
(1957).
and privacy.
69 13 Cal. 3d at 764-65, 533 P.2d at 227, 120
59 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
Cal. Rptr. at 99, quoting Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal.
OId. at 15.
3d 258, 267--68, 486 P.2d 1242, 1246, 96 Cal. Rptr.
6GId. at 2.
42, 48 (1971).
62 Id. at 10.
70 See, e.g., Appeal of Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
63 No. 71-166-JWC (S.D. Cal. 1971).
123 Ind. App. 358, 109 N.E2d 620 (1952) ; Ever64 13 Ca. 3d at 763, 533 P.2d at 226, 120 Cal.
ett v. County of Clinton, 282 S.W.2d 30 (Mo.
Rptr. at 98.
1955).
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nia Code of Civil Procedure, specifically providing for taxpayers' suits.71 Finally, the
courts in several jurisdictions have liberally interpreted the language of state statutes so as to
72
provide for such litigation.
Although the laws of many states would support taxpayer actions such as White's
the California Supreme Court in his case
did extend the right of taxpayer suit to a
situation in which it had rarely been exercised.
Taxpayer actions have often been brought to
prevent the levying of illegal taxes, 73 to prevent the payment of public funds to persons
not authorized to receive them, 7 4 and to avoid
illegal contracts entered into by state and local
governments. 75 But seldom have they been
brought to prevent unlawful official surveillance. Government spying has primarily been
challenged by persons who have been specifi76
cally damaged by the spying activities.
The White case is also unusual and important in that the surveillance involved in that
case was challenged as violating constitutional
rights which have seldom been asserted
in court against government undercover activity, that is, freedom of speech and assembly
and the right to privacy. As the court in
White noted,77 the most familiar limitations on
police investigatory and surveillance activities
are the search and seizure restrictions and
warrant restrictions found in the fourth
amendment to the United States Constitution
and in many state constitutions.78 The SuSee, e.g., IL. REV. ST.r. ch. 102, § 11 (1973);
29, § 63 (1932); OHio
REV. CODE ch. 723, § 59 (1964) ; V.I. CODE ANN.
tit. 5,§ 80 (1957).
7?See, e.g., Hollis v. Piggott Junior Chamber
of Commerce, Inc., 248 Ark. 725, 453 S.W.2d 410
(1970).
73 See, e.g., Knopf v. First Nat. Bank, 173 II.
331, 50 N.E. 660 (1898).
74See J.D.L. Corp. v. Bruckman, 171 Misc. 3,
11 N.Y.S.2d 741 (1939).
75 See, e.g., Henderson v. McCormick, 70 Ariz.
19, 215 P.2d 608 (1950).
76 See, e.g., People v. Triggs, 8 Cal. 3d 884, 506
P.2d 232, 106 Cal. Rptr.408 (1973).
77 13 Cal. 3d at 766, 533 P.2d at 228, 120 Cal.
Rptr. at 100.
78 U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV provides as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
71
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preme Court of the United States has rejected
the contention that government surveillance in
"domestic security" cases is immune from
fourth amendment proscriptions, 7 9 and over the
years many on-going police intelligence operations have been halted for violation of the
rights protected by that amendment and by
similar state provisions. s ' In many situations,
however, citizens may be in a better position to
claim that their freedom of speech or right to
privacy has been violated than to rely on
search and seizure and warrant requirements.
In holding that the allegations in White's
complaint stated a prima facie infringement of
the freedom of speech and assembly guaranteed by the constitutions of the United States
and Calfornia,8 ' the California Supreme Court
distinguished the investigation of specific criminal activity by undercover government agents
from the kind of surveillance of routine and
continuous lawful activities alleged in the case
at bar.8 2 The court also cited United States
Supreme Court cases indicating that to compel an individual to disclose his political ideas
or affiliations to the government is to deter his
exercise of first amendment rights, 3 and that
police surveillance of university classrooms is
particularly suspect from a constitutional
standpoint.8 4 The defendant's claim that the
to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
The fourth amendment applies directly to rights of
the people against the federal government. The
provisions of the fourth amendment are made applicable to the states by reason of the fourteenth
amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55
(1961).
79 United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 407
U.S. 297 (1972).
80 See, e.g., Wirin v. Parker, 48 Cal. 2d 890, 313
P.2d 844 (1957).
sl The court admitted that comparable federal
and state constitutional provisions for the freedoms
of speech and assembly are not necessarily coextensive, but it did not explore potential variances
in White. 13 Cal. 3d at 767, 533 P.2d at 228, 120
Cal. Rptr. at 100.
82 13 Cal. 3d at 765, 533 P.2d at 227, 120 Cal.
Rptr. at 99.
83 Id. at 768, 533 P.2d at 229, 120 Cal. Rptr. at
101. The cases cited included Talley v. California,
362 U.S. 60 (1960) ; and National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama,
357 U.S. 449 (1958). Both pointed out that secrecy can sometimes be essential to the organization of effective dissent. 362 U.S. at 64; 357 U.S.
at 462.
84 13 Cal. 3d at 768-69, 533 P.2d at 229-30, 120
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semi-public nature of a -university classroom
negates any claim of first amendment infringement was rejected by the court. Instead, the
court reasoned that the risk a student takes in
speaking in class that other students will record his statement and remember it in the future is qualitatively different from that posed
by a police surveillance system involving the
filing of reports in permanent police records.8 5
As a result of the alleged infringement on the
freedoms of speech and assembly, the court
found that the defendant would have the heavy
burden of showing that his actions bore a necessary relation to a compelling state interest.8 6
This burden would be all the heavier, according to the court, because of alleged intrusion
into the particularly sacrosanct environs of a
university classroom and because White alleged that information gathered by the police
through their operations at U.C.L.A. pertained
to no "illegal activity or acts." s7
By finding a prima facie infringement of the
freedoms of speech and assembly guaranteed by
the constitutions of the United States and California, the court in White v. Davis, as it had done
in finding standing to sue, established a procedure courts in other states could easily follow in
curbing government spying. Most, if not all,
state constitutions contain provisions guaranteeing the freedom of speech and assembly.
And, of course, the United States Constitution's provisions, including those for free
speech and assembly, are applicable throughout
the nation.
Cal. Rptr, at 101-02: The cases cited included
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589
(1967) ; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) ;
and Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234
(1957). All mentioned, in one way or another, that
the classroom is peculiarly the "marketplace of
ideas" where the nation's future leaders must be
trained through the robust exchange of views. 385
U.S. at 603; 364 U.S. at 487; 354 U.S. at 250.
85 13 Cal. 3d at 768 n.4, 533 P.2d at 229 n.4, 120
Cal. Rptr. at 101 n.4.
86 Id. at 772, 533 P.2d at 232, 120 Cal. Rptr. at
104.
S7 Id. at 773, 533 P.2d at 232, 120 Cal. Rptr. at
104. Compare the court's treatment of the free
speech issue in White with that of the court in
Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General, No.
74-2640 (2d Cir. Dec. 29, 1974), where a suit was
unsuccessfully brought to enjoin the Director of
the F.B.I. and his agents from conducting secret
surveillance of a convention of the Young Socialist
Alliance. There it was contended by the Socialist

[Vol. 66

In finding that the facts alleged by White
also constituted a prima facie violation of the
California Constitution's right of privacy provision, the court held that the principal mischiefs at which the -provision was aimed were:
(1) 'government snooping' and the secret gathering of personal information; (2) the overbroad collection and retention of unnecessary
personal information by government and business interests; (3) the improper use of information properly obtained for a specific purpose . . .; and (4) the lack of a reasonable
88
check on the accuracy of existing records.

The court also found that the constitutional
provision, like most constitutional restraints,
does not prohibit all government incursions on
individual privacy, but creates a right of privacy enforceable by the individual citizen only
when the government action cannot be justified by a compelling state interest.89 As with
regard to the alleged violations of the freedom
of speech and assembly, the court found that
the defendant would face a heavy burden at
trial in establishing the legality of his actions.
By finding a prima facie violation of the California Constitution's right of privacy provision, the court in White also found a means
of attacking government
snooping that
courts in other states could use. The
great majority of American courts that have
taken a position on the matter have held that
there is a right of privacy at common law, 90
although in several states there are statutes
limiting the right of privacy to a cause of action for the use of one's name or picture for

Workers Party that surveillance of the convention
activities by the F.B.I. would have a "chilling effect" on free expression at the convention and that
knowledge of probable F.B.I. surveillance would
discourage attendance at the convention, as it had
at previous ones held by the Y.S.A. The court refused to prohibit surveillance, however, on condition that the F.B.I. refrain from transmitting the
names of persons attending the convention to the
Civil Service Commission.
88 13 Cal. 3d at 775, 533 P.2d at 234, 120 Cal.
Rptr. at 106.
89 Id.
90 See Annot., 14 A.L.R. 2d 750 (1950) ; Annot.,

168 A.L.R. 446 (1947); Annot., 138 A.L.R. 22
(1942). Intrusion upon a person's seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs is generally recognized as an invasion of the common law right of
privacy, and government snooping would certainly
seem to fit under that description.
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purposes of advertising or trade without one's
consent. 91 There are even a few states, in addition to California, which provide a right of privacy in their constitutions, 92 and the United
States Constitution has been said to provide a
right of privacy which is binding on all of the
states through the fourteenth amendment.93
In conclusion, the California Supreme Court
has set a precedent in White v. Davis which
may lead to an increasing number of taxpayer
suits being filed in state courts across the
91 See Annot., 14 A.L.R. 2d 750 (1950) ; Annot.,
168 A.L.R. 446 (1947); Annot., 138 A.L.R. 22
(1942).
92 For examples of other state constitutional
provisions mentioning a right to privacy, see Aiz.
CoNsT. art. 2, § 8; HAwAn CONsT. art. 1, § 5;
ILL. CoNsT. art. 1, §§ 6, 12; WASH. CONsT. art. 1,
§ 7. None of these constitutional provisions has yet
been used to invalidate government snooping.
Some have been said to have the same effect as
the fourth amendment to the U.S. Constitution,
and to confer no additional rights. See, e.g., Cluff
v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 10 Ariz. App.
560, 460 P2d 666 (1969).
93 In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965), the Supreme Court suggested that a right
of privacy exists in the penumbra emanating from
the first amendment freedoms of speech and as-

country to enjoin, on grounds of infringement
of the freedom of speech and assembly and/or
the right to privacy, expenditures of state and
local funds for government surveillance. A
reversal of the United States Supreme Court
decision in Laird v. Tatum, allowing taxpayer
suits to be brought in federal courts, would
further advance the cause of providing a legal
solution to government spying on innocent private citizens. So would the granting of standing to federal taxpayers to challenge federal
undercover activities. Whether White will set
a trend leading to these developments, however, is difficult to say. At present, the only
foreseeable result of White, which is nevertheless a significant one, is the establishment for
the first time of an effective remedy for the
general public against state and local government snooping.
sembly, the third amendment prohibition against
quartering soldiers in the home, the fourth amendment search and seizure provisions, the fifth amendment self-incrimination clause, and the ninth
amendment reservation of unenumerated rights to
the people. The court applied the right of privacy
to the states through the fourteenth amendment.

